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Barry A. K. Rider*
I. Insider Dealing-Is Anyone Bothered?
There was a time in Britain when even senior representatives
of the financial services industry were prepared to be quoted in the
press, as expressing doubts as to whether there was anything
intrinsically wrong with directors and other corporate insiders
taking advantage of their better knowledge about their companies,
in their own investment dealings. Indeed, some even went so far as
to say that this was both proper and natural. True it is that, in
Britain or for that much in continental Europe, there are few, even
among the groves of academia, that would have advanced the
theories justifying insider dealing that Professor Henry Manne so
clearly articulated in Insider Trading and the Stock Market.'
Nonetheless, in what was then the leading book on the law and
practise of the stock market, the authors, a leading Queens Counsel
and an eminent stockbroker, expressed the view in 1972 that a
* Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies,
University of London and Fellow of Jesus College, University of Cambridge.
1. INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (The Free Press 1966).
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stockbroker who learnt even privileged information should not
allow this to operate to the detriment of his client.2 Having said this
Sir Winston Churchill complained that it was defamatory to assert
that advantage had been taken of "inside information" during the
so called Marconi scandal in 1911' and there are comments in a
report to the House of Commons by special commissioners as early
as November 1696' roundly criticising promoters of overvalued
stock selling out, in the entrepreneurial fashion eloquently
advocated by Professor Manne, on the basis of their privileged
knowledge and position. Thus, discussion of the pros and cons of
insider dealing, at least in Britain, has tended to be emotional
rather than based on economic or even pseudo-economic analysis
of empirical data. Even the surveys that have been conducted on
attitudes to the practice would hardly impress a statistician.
In fact, little attempt has been made in Britain to examine the
incidence of insider abuse, save than on an anecdotal basis, other
than in the context of take-over activity. Even here, the results do
little more than indicate, the market tends to creep up before a bid
is announced, a hardly surprising conclusion whether we take the
market as efficient, in any of the classic formulations, or merely
prone to influence by those in the know. Sadly, like in so many
other areas of activity even the statistical information that we have
been able to develop and collate in a reasonably intelligent fashion,
serves almost any argument that can be advanced with plausibility.
Perhaps one of the less conspiratorial reasons why so little real
research has taken place in Britain is because we have so few
academics interested in the regulation of financial markets
Indeed, there are probably fewer legal scholars interested in the
topic today in Britain than there was before we had any substantive
law.6 In fact, the University of Cambridge took the subject out of
its syllabus three years ago, after teaching it for seventeen years! In
the result academic lawyers in Britain have not been tempted into
2. COOPER & CRIDLAN, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE STOCK
EXCHANGE 104 (Sweet & Maxwell 1972).
3. See BARRY RIDER & H. LEIGH FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING 1 (1979). THE COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, Feb. 8, 1872
referred to insider dealing as being "a very great evil."
4. H.C. JOUR., Nov. 25, 1696.
5. See Barry Rider, Centering Company Law, 17 Co. LAW (1996) at 289,
Barry Rider, A Missed Opportunity, 6 JFC 103 (1998), and Barry Rider (Ed.), The
Corporate Dimension, (Jordans 1998).
6. See Barry Rider (ed.), Casting the Runes, LAW AT THE CENTRE, (Kluwer
1999); see also BARRY RIDER (Ed.), THE REALM OF COMPANY LAW (Kluwer
1998).
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the areas of analysis that their North American counterparts have.
Indeed, the appreciation of many scholars in many of our law
schools of such work is problematical. Socioeconomic analysis of
issues in the context of the law is not nearly established in Britain as
it is in some other countries and therefore has not been able to
make the contribution that it should to the debate on such matters
as insider dealing. The research and deliberation that has taken
place has tended to follow well tested if not now well worn paths of
jurisprudence. The most recent writings do little more than
reiterate the discussions that took place, invariably outside
academia, in the early to mid 1970s.
II. Fiduciaries and Insiders
The common law given its pragmatic determination to avoid
the conceptual ticket that it might otherwise have had to cut its way
through, had it ever deigned to recognise that unfairness is a
meaningful issue in the determination as to the existence of a right
rather than merely its exercise, has little to offer in regard to insider
trading.8 The principle of "caveat emptor" reinforced by the
pervading notion that mere reticence cannot amount to fraud, has
rendered those disadvantaged in dealing with an insider in practical
terms remediless. It is only where the plaintiff can establish a
relationship which justifies the invocation of equitable principles of
fair dealing, or the circumstances9 import an extraneous duty of
disclosure that a failure to share the privileged information in
question will be actionable at English law. Of course, where the
parties are not in a direct and probably personal transaction the
chances of constructing a special relationship importing such
obligations of disclosure or at least fair dealing, become remote if
not negligible. Even if it is possible to find a operative
misrepresentation, which invariably it is not, in the context of an
indirect and impersonal transaction-such as that on a market, the
problems of either determining a satisfactory remedy let alone
establishing causal loss are such as to defeat other than the most
7. See, e.g., B. BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING
(Graham & Trotman 1991).
8. See BARRY RIDER AND T.M. ASHE (Eds.), THE FIDUCIARY, THE INSIDER
AND THE CONFLICT Ch. 12 (Brehon, Sweet & Maxwell 1995); Barry Rider, Conflict
of Interest: An English Problem, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (Kluwer
1998); and BARRY RIDER, INSIDER TRADING, Ch. 2 (Jordans 1983).
9. See Barry Rider, 40 M.L.R. 471 (1977); 41 M.L.R. 583 (1978); and Barry
Rider, Partnership Law and its Impact on Domestic Companies, 38 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 148 (1979).
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imaginative academic. The English courts always conscious not to
open the "floodgates" to litigation, have always shown a marked
reluctance to contemplate implied representations of any kind, let
alone as to fair dealing, in commercial and market transactions.
The common law does not sit comfortably with civilian notions of
good faith. This is so even in the restrictive and determined context
of a contract, let alone in the wider and ill-defined environment of a
market with essentially random coupling or parties, where privity is
at best a fiction. The only indication that the common law's
indifference might be a little more equivocal than the vast bulk of
precedent would fairly indicate, is the possibility that a court might
refrain from lending to a party its support in enforcing a bargain
which would amount to the crime of insider dealing."0 The
argument that as a matter of public policy such contracts should be
unenforceable is far more problematical.
Notwithstanding the coyness of the common law to do more
than protect the kind of rights that our Anglo Saxon forebears
would have recognised, some have pointed to the cases on what for
want of a better term might be described as "secret profits." Where
a fiduciary takes advantage, without full disclosure and assent, of
information and or an opportunity that comes to him by virtue of
his position as a fiduciary, then the cases indicate that he may well
be called to account to his principal for any benefit he makes. This
liability to yield up the "secret profit" is personal to the fiduciary
and would apparently not extend to the situation where he allows
another to so benefit. Furthermore, it is not at all certain that this
sort of liability extends to the making of a "secret profit" by
avoiding an otherwise certain loss. The important point to
remember is that the claim for an account, is not a compensatory
remedy, it is a process developed in Chancery to vindicate and
reinforce notions of good stewardship. While it now seems likely
that it may be possible to trace the proceeds of an actual profit,
notwithstanding the absence of a traditional "proprietary
relationship"'  and the courts have recently recognised a
restitutionary measure of damages in contract," in practice the
contention that this area of the law is a satisfactory control in
insider abuse is nonsense. While there have been cases where
fiduciaries and former fiduciaries have been held to account for the
10. See Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd. v. Goodman, B.C.L.C. 897 (1991),
discussed in BARRY RIDER & T.M. ASHE, INSIDER CRIME 65 (Jordans 1993).
11. Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Reid, 1 All E.R. 1 (1994).
12. Attorney General v. Blake, 1 All E.R. 833 (1998).
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profits that they have made by effectively using privileged
information and opportunity," there are no cases in England and
precious few in the Commonwealth," that give any credibility to the
view that the fiduciary obligation is a real constraint on insider
dealing. The essential limitations of the action and the practical
difficulties of proof and standing before the courts, not to mention
costs, combine to render this weapon of little use. Even if by legal
magic we convert the inside information in question into some form
of property, as it has been argued was done in at least one major
decision of the House of Lords, 5 and then attempt to invoke the
law of constructive trust, which itself has in recent years become
vibrant, it is not clear that in practical terms we have a better or
more efficacious weapon.
Thus, even in the very realm of law which does concern itself
about fair dealing and good faith; namely equity; in practical terms
the issues that we encounter in insider dealing cases have not been
addressed. Indeed, the very jurisdiction of the courts to enforce
good stewardship is not entirely clear. It is contended, that the
obligation not to take an unauthorised benefit stems from that
fundamental and immutable obligation on all fiduciaries to eschew
conflicts of interest and duty. By succumbing to the temptation to
derive a benefit, which he is not prepared to disclose and submit to
his principal, the fiduciary has placed himself in a position where his
own self interest is in open competition with his paramount duty to
that principal. 6 It is not, however, always the case that such a trite
and simple analysis can be justified. Even if the rule is regarded as
being of such fundamental importance to the honour of equity that
no departure from the strict ethic can be tolerated, even where
there is no loss to the principal and no real issue as to competition,
the courts have found difficulty in applying it in cases of conflict
where more than two parties are involved. 7 It is perhaps better to
regard the fiduciary as being under a disability rather than under an
affirmative obligation to favour, at all costs, the advantage of one
13. See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 2 A.C. 134 (1967); Boardman v.
Phipps, 2 A.C. 46 (1967) (but note the fact that those who were held liable to
account had acted without probity). See Barry Rider, Amiable Lunatics and the
Rule in Foss v. Harbottle, C.L.J. 270, 276 (1978).
14. See Glandon Pty. Ltd. v. Strata Consolidated Pty. Ltd., 11 A.C.S.R. 543
(1993).
15. See Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Reid, supra note 11; see generally
GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES Ch. 12 (Jordans).
16. See generally C. NAKAJIMA, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND DUTY (Kluwer
1999).
17. Barry Rider, The Fiduciary and the Frying Pan, CONVEYANCER 114 (1978).
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principal against another, or even conceivably himself. While of
considerable importance, these matters are fairly beyond the scope
of our present discussion, but it is pertinent to note that even in
such a well rehearsed area of the law, the issues are still in debate.
III. The Legislators and Insider Trading
If the courts have not articulated any principle that can be
invoked in rationalising the control of insider abuse, it must be said
that in Britain, Parliament has done little more. Although there
were those who argued that the use or may we say, disclosing our
own predilections, the abuse of inside information needed to be
circumscribed by legislative action, such views were not well
conceived, with the exception of the Jenkins Committee,18 until the
early Seventies. Legislative action against insider abuse before this
was confined to requiring directors to report their own and families'
dealings in the securities of their own and associated issuers19 and to
a blanket prohibition on the purchase of options,20 of any kind, in
the securities of their own company or an associated issuer, on their
own behalf or that of their immediate family. As it was by no
means certain that taking advantage of inside information was
considered improper, until relatively recently, by those likely to be
aware a director had reported his dealings, it is far from clear that
the disclosure of insider transactions had any real effect in
discouraging the abuse of inside information. Of course, even
today when such disclosure obligations, reinforced by the
requirements of The Stock Exchange and other markets, are so
easily evaded or ignored it remains to be seen whether they serve to
discourage, rather than merely inconvenience, the determined
insider dealer. The policing of the statutory obligations by the
authorities is virtually non-existent and those that have been
prosecuted for failure to obey them can be counted on one's
fingers. The prohibition on buying options, which one would have
thought would be highly relevant to the control of insider abuse in
the derivatives market, has been invoked on three occasions since
1967.
Whether the then, essentially self-regulatory, system did fail-
to the degree that it has been assumed, in controlling insider
trading, is not as certain as some claim.2 ' The self-regulators were
18. Cmd. 1749 (1962).
19. Companies Act, §§ 324 to 329 (1985).
20. Id. at § 323.
21. See generally Barry Rider and E. Hew, The Regulation of Corporation and
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reasonably efficient in smelling out misconduct and in "punishing"
those responsible. Of course, the processes were not as transparent
and as independent as we have come to expect of those charged
with such a function and the punishments were often ill-defined and
smacked more of exclusion than a formal sanction. However, when
the City was reasonably homogeneous and confined within the
village of the "Square Mile" it did achieve a level of efficacy which
would surprise many. The suspension of exchange control
regulation which served as a catalyst for the fundamental changes
that occurred in the structure of the financial intermediaries and the
way in which business is conducted, effectively undermined the
ability of the various self-regulatory and essentially self-interested
authorities to police an international market. It also became
increasingly apparent that the gentlemanly procedures of the City
bodies were no match for those who deliberately set about
manipulating and despoiling the markets. Self-regulators without
the power to conduct investigations otherwise than on the basis of
consent could not deal with foreign nominees and individuals who
did not care whether they were respected in the City and West End
clubs. Consequently, there were increasingly calls for statutory
intervention in regard to what the then Conservative Prime
Minister, The Rt. Hon. Edward Heath MP described as the most
unpleasant wart on the ugly face of capitalism, insider dealing.22
The press focused on cases of insider abuse that surfaced, mainly in
the context of contested international take-overs, 3 invariably there
was rather more involved than the taking advantage of privileged
information, but it was the "capitalist crime par excellence" which
attracted most of the comment. The milking of inside information
by those on the inside track accentuated all the other, actual and
perceived, inequalities of the City and its new operators. Insider
dealing is unfair, because those who can take advantage of inside
information are placed in such a privileged position unfairly. They
went to the right schools, they were always on the inside-it was
portrayed, with some justification in the popular press, as a "them
Securities Laws in Britain-The Beginning of the Real Debate, 19 MAL. L.R. 144
(1977); Barry Rider and E. Hew, The Structure of Regulation and Supervision in
the Field of Corporation and Securities Laws in Britain, 41 REVUE DE LA BANQUE
83 (1977); and Barry Rider, Policing the City- Combating Fraud and other Abuses
in the Corporate Securities Industry, 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 47 (1988).
22. See Barry Rider, One Aspect of the Unacceptable Face of Capitalism: The
Crime of Being Something Big in the City, OBITER 9 (1975).
23. See generally Barry Rider and E. Hew, The Role of the City Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers in the Regulation of Insider Trading in Britain, 20 MAL. L.R. 315
(1978).
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and us" issue. Much in the same way as in recent years in Britain,
popular attention has focused on what are considered to be
excessive executive benefits and remuneration for "fat cat"
directors and corporate employees.24
The City bodies fearful that a full blown regulator with legal
powers would be imposed on the industry, were happy to deflect
attention on to the need for tough legislation to criminalise insider
abuse. This had the effect, when it occurred in 1980, of placing the
policing of this thorny problem beyond their remit. The Panel on
Take-overs and Mergers, which had always achieved a level of
success in policing the anti-insider dealing provisions in its Code,'
was pleased to announce that now that insider dealing was a
specific crime, it would be highly inappropriate for it, as a self-
regulatory authority, to attempt to investigate cases which might
end up before the courts. Outlawing insider abuse effectively
removed responsibility for policing it from the City to the
government and the police. Of course, the self-regulators were
prepared to cooperate with the authorities, provided their
constitutions and members enabled and permitted them to do so,
and in the few instances that the Department of Trade and Industry
and the police were able to identify abuse, take some action within
their own disciplinary jurisdiction.
Those who called for statutory intervention, did so on the basis
that insider trading was an abuse against the market and therefore a
wrong deserving of public sanction through the criminal law. This
was logical if not particularly imaginative. The criminal law has
long been used in Britain in protecting markets26 on the basis that
the State has a real responsibility to ensure that such function
efficiently and properly. Furthermore, history records that the
Crown and other public authorities had a financial interest in the
holding of markets and were therefore concerned that nothing was
done to undermine their viability. It is also the case, that there is a
strongly rooted view within British society that where a public
sanction is to be applied, then it is proper that the accused should
have the protections guaranteed by the traditional criminal justice
24. L. Miles, Fat Cats and Windfall Tax, 19 Co. LAW 70 (1998); C. Slaughter,
Corporate Social Responsibility-A New Perspective, 18 Co LAW 313 (1997).
25. See Barry Rider, Self-Regulation: The British Approach to Policing
Conduct in the Securities Business, With Particular Reference to the Role of the City
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 1 J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 319 (1978).
26. See BARRY RIDER, C. ABRAMS & T.M ASHE, GUIDE To FINANCIAL
SERVICES REGULATION, Ch. 1 (3rd ed. CCH 1998), and BRITISH SECURITIES LAW
SERVICE Vol. 1 Tab 1, (Barry Rider, ed.) (CCH).
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system. Hence, even in the early attempts to impose regulation
over the embryonic financial markets in London in the Seventeenth
Century, it was the criminal law that was invoked to control those
accused of malpractice and abuse.27 Consequently, it is perhaps not
surprising that virtually no thought was given, during the debate, as
to whether it might be appropriate to utilise other legal mechanisms
than the criminal law in controlling or at least discouraging insider
abuse. Although it is true that even in the United States of
America it was not for some time that the civil law started to play a
significant role in inhibiting insider abuse, and the reasons for this
development were peculiar to the system, the New Deal legislation
in the 30s did show ingenuity in utilising alternative mechanisms
than the ordinary criminal law.' For example, the short swing
profits rule in section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934,
albeit not concerned with insider abuse of information as such, was
an imaginative attempt to discourage insider speculation without
resorting to prohibition and the ordinary criminal law. Of course,
given the constitutional position in the United States and the
importance of the Securities and Exchange Commission's pivotal
role, it is understandable that reliance was not placed on the
criminal law even in regard to matters where the criminal law had
already intervened, such as in regard to market manipulation. In
the British context, however, the desire to inhibit insider abuse has
always led us into the criminal law and thus, the problems of the
criminal justice system.
III. The Efficacy of the Criminal Law
In 1986 Lord Justice Roskill's Fraud Trial Committee29
reported that the British public had no confidence whatsoever in
the ability of the criminal justice system to bring the perpetrators of
serious fraud effectively and expeditiously to book. Lord Justice
Roskill and his committee added that they considered on the basis
of the evidence that they had received, the public was justified in
this view. The system just did not work. The reasons why the
criminal law has proved ineffective in curbing economically
motivated crime are well known and need little mention here. °
27. See G. Gilligan, The Origins of UK Financial Services Regulation, 18 Co.
LAW 167 (1997).
28. See also D. Fitzsimons, Controlling Insider Trading- The Civil Approach
in New Zealand, 4 J.F.C. 309 (1997).
29. Report of the Fraud Trial Committee, H.M.S.O. para. 1 (1986).
30. See generally Barry Rider, Civilising the Law-The Use of Civil and
Administrative Proceedings to Enforce Financial Services Law, 3 J.F.C. 11 (1995),
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Where the conduct in question takes place in a commercial or
financial environment, the transactions are likely to be complex and
difficult for investigators, prosecutors and the tribunal to
understand.31 Indeed, it is in the interests of the criminal to try and
render the circumstances as confusing as possible. This may not
only effectively rule out detection, but render a subsequent
investigation too difficult or too costly. It may also discourage a
prosecutor attempting to present the matter to a court. The ability
to involve another jurisdiction at a critical stage in the commission
of the crime, or at least in its consummation, provides yet another
stumbling block.32 Effective international cooperation in regard to
taking evidence and rendering it admissible, although improving, is
not efficient and in many instances is in practical terms
nonexistent.33 The traditional criminal law is parochial in its
character and reach. Even if jurisdiction is found, the practical
difficulties and costs attendant on pursuing a matter which requires
evidence from another country often represent a most serious
hurdle. In such cases documentary evidence is often crucial and
apart from its susceptibility to being rendered unreliable, will be
difficult and often expensive to bring before the court. The nature
of fraud is such that it will often be some considerable time after
the crime, that the agencies of the criminal justice system become
involved. This gives those responsible for the crime an opportunity
to hide and destroy evidence, to launder the profits and move to a
jurisdiction not easily able or perhaps willing to respond to requests
for assistance, let alone extradition. Where special legislation is
enacted to deal with specific problems, such as insider dealing, the
offences are invariably complex and require more evidence,
susceptible to even higher standards of proof than the ordinary
law.3'
In most countries those charged with the responsibility of
investigation, prosecuting and trying such cases will often have no
or little specialised knowledge of the environment within which the
and Barry Rider, Fraud in the Financial Markets, in THE REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKETS (SNP 1990).
31. See generally, JURIES IN SERIOUS FRAUD TRIALS: A CONSULTATION
DOCUMENT, HOME OFFICE Chs. 1 and 2 (1998).
32. See M. Findlay, Crime as a Force in Globalisation, 6 J.F.C. 103 (1998).
33. See Barry Rider, Policing the International Financial Markets: An English
Perspective, XVI BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179 (1990). See also D. Chaikin & Barry
Rider, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Commonwealth Perspective,
Commonwealth Law Ministers, COMMW. SECRETARIAT (London 1983).
34. See BARRY RIDER & T.M. ASHE, THE FIDUCIARY, THE INSIDER AND THE
CONFLICT Ch. 13 (Brehon, Sweet & Maxwell 1995).
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crime has occurred and may be unpractised in the ielevant law. On
the other hand, those accused of such crimes, which often carry
relatively little stigma, have access to such expertise and
cooperation that their ill-gotten gains affords. Invariably there are
no "real" victims or if there are, they may well have been so
disadvantaged by the fraud, as to be impecunious and of no real
threat to the wrongdoers. Indeed, the more vicious the fraud the
less likely there are to be victims left around who are going to be
able to challenge what has occurred. In the case of insider dealing,
as we have already seen, it is even difficult to characterise those
who happened to deal with the insider or his nominee as a victim in
any real sense of the world, let alone expect such an individual to
respond to the "crime" with the degree of outrage that might better
fuel official action. It must also be said that in a good many
countries, for this and other reasons, even when a matter is brought
before the courts, judges and even juries do not consider the wrong
particularly egregious and the penalties imposed are on occasion
derisory.35 This does not send out a particularly appropriate signal
in terms of denunciation, or for that matter to those who have spent
possibly years pursuing the matter. The development of electronic
trading through markets where notions of trust and territoriality are
meaningless, exacerbates the problems.36 Added to this is the
increasing awareness on the part of criminals, and even organised
crime, that economic crime is both high in reward and low in risk.
The agencies of the criminal justice system may not always be
well suited to address, or for that matter even perceive, the
sensitivities of complex economic activities.37 In most jurisdictions,
and Britain is no exception in this regard, the detection and
investigation of crime is a matter for the ordinary police. In
situations where the crime may not be obvious, except in the
accumulation of wealth, and there are not articulate and well
35. See generally T.M. ASHE & L. COUNSELL, INSIDER TRADING Appendix 5
(2nd ed. 1993). See also J. Rakoff & J. Eaton, How Effective is U.S. Enforcement
in Deterring Insider Trading?, 3 J.F.C. 283 (1996). See also J. SUTER, THE
REGULATION OF INSIDER DEALING IN BRITAIN, (Butterworths 1989).
36. See REPORT ON JURISDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES ON THE INTERNET, FINANCIAL LAW PANEL (1998); G. P. Rutledge, The
Internet and US Financial Markets, 6 J.F.C. 129 (1998); N. Deirne & A. Herring,
Financial Services Regulation and the Internet in the UK, 19 Co. LAW 264 (1998);
and BARRY RIDER, THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF FRAUD AND ABUSE IN
ELECTRONIC SECURITIES MARKETS (E.S.I. 1995).
37. Barry Rider, Combating International Commercial Crime 217 (L.M.C.L.O.
1985), and Barry Rider, The Promotion and Development of International
Cooperation to Combat Commercial and Economic Crime, Commonwealth Law
Ministers, COMMW. SECRETARIAT (London 1980).
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positioned victims, then it is perhaps hardly surprising that
traditional processes for detection and identification of crime are
less than effective. Ordinary law enforcement agencies do not have
access to the environment within which such activity as insider
abuse occurs. The social, financial and even intellectual barriers are
such as to render most police agencies wholly ill-suited to the task
of investigation, let alone detection. This is not to belittle the
operation and culture of traditional policing, but to recognise that
police agencies because of their position in society, the resources
available to them, the career structures within which their officers
are bound to work, the political and other pressures to respond in a
manifest way to the more obvious and thus, in popular sentiment
more dangerous crimes in the street, such agencies are ill-placed to
make the commitment to pursue such matters as insider trading.
Traditional law enforcement is in practical terms almost
institutionally disabled from effective policing of crime in the
financial markets. Of course, this is not to discount or undervalue
the tremendous efforts of individual officers who are able and
willing to invest time, often their own, and effort in making out a
viable case, however, sadly the vagaries of the legal system and
perhaps the unsuitability of the ordinary criminal trial process for
dealing with such cases, invariably results in acquittal or a derisory
sanction. This, as we have already noted, does little to reinforce the
commitment of officers in personal or professional terms to take
these cases seriously. For innumerable reasons, not just associated
with resources, but perhaps even more significantly the deep seated
fear of special police with special powers, or at least special
learning, few jurisdictions that have attained any success in
enforcement have been able to retain this capability within the
ordinary structure of law enforcement. Similar problems have been
encountered in regard to the development of criminal intelligence
and in particular the control of terrorism. On the other hand, few
states are prepared to allow those outside the discipline of the
police to wield coercive powers of investigation, interdiction and
arrest. Thus, the irony is presented, whereby those who might be
trusted with the weapons needed to police the criminal law, are
unable to use them, and those who might are not sufficiently
trusted, often by the very legal system, to use them.
At the end of the day, the criminal law, to an extent greater
than any other area of the law, involves the State, with all its
powers and privileges, being at odds with the individual. The
accused risks not only being subjected to the indignities and costs of
the processes of investigation and trial, but deprivation of property
[Vol. 19:1
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and incarceration. Of course, our jurisprudence teaches us that the
criminal law is there to protect the well-being of all within society.
Therefore is not properly represented as the State against the
individual. However, we all know that reality is one thing and
classroom jurisprudence quite another. In the case of economic
crime, or even the wider context of so called "white collar crime,"
the courts and in particular the judiciary have shown sympathy to
those who have been subjected to the rigors of the ordinary
processes of the criminal justice system. This is not merely a matter
of the tribunal being unconvinced that such crimes create "real"
harm to anyone deserving of great pity, but often the identification
by those in the tribunal with the social position and even aspirations
of the accused. While evidence, in the transparent and accountable
world in which we now live, is hard to come by, save by anecdote,
there is a real and popular concern in many countries, including
Britain, that not all members of the judiciary, for example, are
sufficiently dispassionate in regard to such matters. Successful tax
lawyers, who spend most of their professional life, advising very
rich clients how to avoid paying tax, may well, after promotion to
the bench, find difficulty in manifesting their anger against, for
example, a corporate executive who "happens" to sell out his shares
at the wrong time.8 Indeed, selling, even while in possession of
inside information, for the purpose of avoiding tax rather than
profiting by virtue of the information, may well be deemed
unobjectionable. Greed is a nice and very fact specific concept. Of
course, much has been done, in many countries, to make judges and
officials more aware of the social and economic implications of such
matters, but it is hard to explain why a self-confessed fraudster who
was accused of loosing investors millions of pounds received a
punishment of only 180 hours community service. 9 It is also the
case that, justifiably or not, some jurisdictions have acquired the
reputation for taking a rather different view than others, on such
matters as insider dealing. For example, in a case not too long ago,
a District Judge in New York referred to the view that in Hong
Kong to be accused of insider dealing meant you were being fast
38. See R v. Chariton, Cunningham, Kitchen & Wheeler S.T.C. 1418 (1996)
discussed by M. Bridges, P. Atkinson, R. Rhodes & R. Bosworth-Davies, in 2 J. OF
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 197 (1999). See also J. Ungoed-Thomas & E.
Hanzic, Director-Judges Break the Rules Over Business Links, SUNDAY TIMES,
Mar. 18 1999.
39. Roger the Dodger, Convicted After £34m Crash, But He Gets 180 hrs
Community Work, THE SUN, Nov. 27 1993.
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tracked for an honour from the Queen.' While in truth such a
comment is wholly unjustified, as Hong Kong is a jurisdiction that
has long considered insider dealing a serious abuse and done much
to discourage it," the fact remains that there is, at least in some very
influential circles, a perception to the contrary.
IV. Public Markets: Public Law
Insider dealing was made, as we have seen, a specific criminal
offence under Part V of the Companies Act 1980 in Britain." The
law was slightly amended and reenacted in the Company Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act in 1986"3 and then completely recast, to take
account of the European Council Directive on Insider Dealing, in
the Criminal Justice Act 1993." The conceptual justification for
prohibiting insider dealing in the pre-1993 law was, as has already
been pointed out, the importance of promoting and preserving
public confidence in the integrity of the financial markets.
Therefore, the offences were confined to dealings that took place
on a securities exchange or through or with a professional
intermediary. Furthermore, it was simply assumed that it is the
criminal law that is most appropriately deployed in vindicating the
integrity of the public markets." Little if any thought or
40. See Nanus Asia Inc. v. Standard and Chartered Bank, 1 H.K.L.R. 396
(1990) (referring to District Judge Owen's comments).
41. See Barry Rider, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Hong Kong, 17
MAL. L.R. 310 (1975), continued in 18 MAL. L.R. 157 (1976); Barry Rider, Insider
Dealing-Hong Kong Style, 128 N.L.J. 897 (1978); and Barry Rider, The Control of
Commercial Crime in Hong Kong-Proposals for Reform, HONG KONG Gov'T,
LEGAL DEP'T (1980).
42. For a discussion of the law, see BARRY RIDER, INSIDER TRADING, (Jordans
1983). For earlier legislative proposals see BARRY RIDER & H.L. FRENCH, THE
REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING, (Macmillan 1979); Barry Rider, Companies
Bill 1978; Insider Trading, 128 N.L.J. 1236 (1978); and Barry Rider, The Conduct
of Company Directors, 128 N.L.J. 27 (1978). See also D. Sugarman, The
Regulation of Insider Dealing, in Barry Rider (Ed) The Regulation of The British
Securities Industry, (Oyez 1979).
43. See BARRY RIDER, C. ABRAMS & D. CHAIKIN, GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES ACT Ch. 7 (C.C.H. 1987).
44. See BARRY RIDER AND T.M. ASHE, INSIDER CRIME (Jordans 1993); and
BARRY RIDER AND T.M. ASHE, THE FIDUCIARY, THE INSIDER AND THE CONFLICT
(Brehon, Sweet & Maxwell 1995).
45. See for example the dismissal by the Department of Trade of the
suggestion by the House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry
that civil sanctions should be available against insider trading, on the basis that the
criminal law is the appropriate law for protecting the public interest; COMPANY
INVESTIGATIONS: GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE THIRD REPORT OF THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE, C.M. 1149 1989-90 Sess.
(1990); COMPANY INVESTIGATIONS, THIRD REPORT OF THE TRADE AND INDUSTRY
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consideration was given to any other conceptual basis for regulating
insider abuse or invoking any other form of control of regulation.
Even in the discussion that took place in Britain during the decade
that preceded the 1980 Companies Act precious little thought was
given to justifying an approach to control other than on the basis of
public confidence.46 Of course, those who advocated legal controls
pointed out that unrestricted insider dealing allowed those in a
position of trust to abuse the confidence that had been reposed in
them and perhaps even encouraged them to hold back disclosure of
price sensitive information." Indeed, some contended that to allow
insiders to control the flow of information on to the market
provided them with a significant opportunity to manipulate prices.
Surprisingly little attention was, however, given to the relationship
of disclosure obligations to the abuse of undisclosed information. It
was simplistically assumed that by outlawing the use of inside
information, those responsible for disclosing such information to
the market, would see no personal advantage in delaying reporting
and thus, information would be brought through into the market.
To characterise such views as naive is an understatement. Firstly, it
is by no means the case that information that would normally be
required to be disclosed to the market, under legal, contractual or
self-regulatory obligations, is always of the character of that which
would fall within the scope of the law against insider abuse. It is
probable that what might be described as tentative information48
has a much greater significance in personal dealings, and this might
neither have the specificity or materiality to be regarded as
disclosable, let alone sufficient for the imposition of criminal
liability. Furthermore, as the US Federal Courts have long
recognised, 9 those in possession of information, that might fall
within the scope of the offence, will rarely be in a position to
activate the relevant corporate or other disclosure procedures.
COMMITTEE, H.M.S.O. (1990).
46. See Barry Rider, Insider Trading-A Question of Confidence, THE LAW
SOCIETY'S GAZETTE, vol. 77, No 5. (1980). See also Barry Rider & H.L. French,
Should Insider Trading be Regulated-Some Initial Considerations, 95 S.A.L.J. 79
(1978).
47. See Barry Rider, The Enforcement of Corporate Integrity with Particular
Reference to the Role of Disclosure, L.C.B.; GOWER, L. Loss & A.A. SOMMER
(eds.), NEW TRENDS IN COMPANY LAW DISCLOSURE, (L. and Bus. Inc. 1980).
48. See A. Besorai, The Insider and Tentative Information, THE FIDUCIARY,
THE INSIDERS AND THE CONFLICT (Brehon, Sweet & Maxwell 1995).
49. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983); but see United States v. Carpenter 791 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1986). See US v.
O'Hagan No 99-842 (1997) and K. McCoy, 18 Co. LAW 94 (1997) and 18 Co. LAW
335 (1997).
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Indeed, to disclose the relevant information might itself result in a
breach of confidence." Therefore, the choice to disclose or abstain
from trading is unreal. In practice, for the vast majority of primary
or access insiders and those in secondary positions, there is no
choice, as they have no control or even influence over the
mechanisms for disclosure. Their choice is simply to abstain from
disclosure or cheat. Thus, the information either remains outside
the market or is appropriated for improper dealings. The notion,
propounded by Professor Henry Manne, that insider dealing, both
directly and through induced and "tailgate" trading, brings the
information, or at least knowledge of its significance, into the
market has never been substantiated, save in one respect. It is true
that as a consequence of effective stock watch programmes, official
and unofficial, knowledge that there is undisclosed information
about may be signalled. The result of this signalling, may not
always be that the information will be brought into the market. It is
also the case that few systems do have the ability to pick up,
unassisted by other devices and procedures, trading that is based on
inside information. The signalling that occurs, when it does, is often
a result of a number of factors.
V. Organised Insiders
The prohibitive approach to insider dealing may encourage the
exchange and even arbitrage of information. To be fair to
Professor Manne, he himself identified this as a real possibility,
although it was dismissed as fanciful until a series of cases in the
USA and Britain during the late Seventies and early Eighties
demonstrated the existence of a veritable "market" in price
sensitive information. Items of information were syndicated and
exchanged, on occasions even bartered for drugs or other favours.
More recently, investigations not only in the USA, but also Britain,
Germany, France, Japan, Hong Kong and Australia have indicated
the involvement of organised crime groups, not only in obtaining
price sensitive information through intrusive and exploitative
action, but then its marketing. As most systems and procedures for
detection depend in the final analysis on identifying a nexus or
relationship, collateral or otherwise, between the individual who
draws down the profit and a privileged source, whether legitimate
or not, the syndication and disassociation of information, effectively
places such operations beyond the reach of traditional methods of
50. See Barry Rider, The Abuse of Inside Information, 127 N.L.J. 832 (1977).
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control. In effect the information is being laundered. To some
extent the process and certainly the result is not too dissimilar to
the laundering of the proceeds of crime. In cases where it is
necessary to reinvest at least part of the proceeds of crime in a
continuing criminal enterprise or evade the risks of confiscation or
other risks of interference, it is necessary to disassociate the profit
from its method of creation. In other words, the nexus between the
crime generating the profit and the wealth that represents the
profit, must be broken or at least sufficiently obscured so that those
seeking to exhibit the connection are either discouraged or
frustrated. 1 In fact the debate on controlling the laundering of the
proceeds of crime is not unconnected with that relating to insider
abuse. Although these topics are distinct and have not been
associated in the minds of commentators, it is not, in the view of the
present author, merely by chance that legislation directed against
money laundering and insider dealing is often linked. The same is
true in regard to arrangements for international mutual assistance 2
Perhaps given the increasing amount of evidence, or rather
intelligence, that is coming to light indicating that serious criminals
have moved into financial crime and in particular insider dealing, it
is appropriate to dwell on this matter a little longer.
While care always needs to be taken not to sensationalise
either the extent or impact of organised crime activity, it is sadly a
fact that the activities of organisations devoted to accumulating and
controlling considerable amounts of wealth is today a real threat to
world stability.53 The vast amounts of money are generated through
illicit trafficking in drugs and other contraband is so great as to play
a real role in the world economy.' For a number of reasons it has
51. See Barry Rider, The Practical and Legal Aspects of Interdicting the Flow
of Dirty Money, 3 J.F.C. 234 (1996); see generally T.M. ASHE AND BARRY RIDER
(eds.), MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, (Brehon, Sweet & Maxwell 1997).
52. See generally Barry Rider, Blindman's Bluff-A Model for Securities
Regulation, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS (Kluwer 1996).
53. See generally Barry Rider, Memorandum 15, Organised Crime in the
United Kingdom: A Personal Perspective, in ORGANISED CRIME, MINUTES OF
EVIDENCE AND MEMORANDA, HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS,
H.M.S.O. (1994); Organised Crime, THIRD REPORT OF THE HOME AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, H.M.S.O. (1995); and A. Shipman & Barry
Rider, Organised Crime International, SECURITY AND DEFENCE (Cornhill Pub.
1987).
54. See BARRY RIDER & T.M. ASHE (eds.), INTERNATIONAL TRACING OF
ASSETS, vol. 1, Ch. 1 (Sweet & Maxwell 1997); BARRY RIDER & C. NAKAJIMA,
MONEY LAUNDERING SERVICE Ch. 8 (C.C.H. 1999). See also Barry Rider,
Organised Crime, Expert Memorandum to Commonwealth Law Ministers,
COMMW. SECRETARIAT (1983), and Barry Rider, TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE TO
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become desirable for these organisations to launder this wealth and
it is to the financial markets that they are increasingly drawn. Their
reliance on financial intermediation has brought them into the
financial world as customers, but increasingly as providers of capital
and services55. For many years, the more astute criminal
organisations have recognised that financial fraud is attractive not
only in terms of the rewards that it generates but also because it
exposes them to far less risk of interdiction. Organised crime has
been involved for some considerable time in boiler room operations
and market manipulation. 6 The profits that can be made through
exploiting, directly or indirectly, price sensitive information when
compared with the minuscule risk of punishment, has rendered
insider trading particularly attractive. Such organisations do not,
however, seek to rely upon the odd tip from an insider, instead they
have gone about acquiring inside information themselves. In some
cases they have installed informants within companies, perhaps as a
secretary or as a cleaner, in others they have extorted information
from executives or utilised sophisticated electronic listening
devices. In one or two instances organised crime has been bold
enough to intervene directly in management and seek to influence
the operation and timing of corporate disclosure. Those who have
made significant profits through insider dealing have also been
willing to turn to organised crime groups to assist them in
laundering the proceeds of their crime. Others have bartered and
sold inside information to organised crime for drugs or for .cash.
There are also examples of individuals who wish to exploit inside or
privileged information coming together and structuring their
relationship in such a manner as to be indistinguishable from an
organised crime operation. Indeed, as early as 1984 the then Head
of Enforcement57 at the London Stock Exchange reported that
there were highly sophisticated dealing syndicates operating on the
THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE SELECT COMMITTEES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
PARLIAMENT, Capetown, Aug. 1998.
55. See Barry Rider, The Financial World at Risk; The Dangers of Organised
Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption, 9 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 3 (1993);
Barry Rider, The Enterprise of Crime, in MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL
(Roundhall, Sweet & Maxwell 1996).
56. See D. FRANCIS, CONTRAPRENEURS Pt. 1 (Macmillan 1988); Barry Rider,
Taking the Profit Out of Corruption, CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY, C.O.L.P.I.
(1994). See also Fraud Trial Unmasks Mob Muscling in on Wall Street, SUNDAY
MORNING POST, Mar 21, 1999.
57. Mr. Robert Wilkinson. Mr. Wilkinson came in for a good deal of criticism
for being so blunt. However, evidence came increasingly to light during the 1980s
to prove the accuracy of his observations.
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Stock Exchange through complex webs of nominees and offshore
accounts. The City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers had drawn
attention to the use of offshore nominees and the like, frustrating
their own investigations a decade before this. The experience of
countries such as Canada, Japan and Australia in this regard has
been even more alarming.
VI. Taking the Profit Out of Insider Abuse
While it is obvious that many forms of crime are motivated by
economic gain, apart from one or two exceptions, there were few
legal precedents designed to take the profit out of crime. It is true
that in early English law conviction for a felony might result in the
confiscature of property in favour of the Crown. But this had
rather more to do with notions of feudal responsibility and raising
revenue, than the control of crime. With the development of
criminal activity which requires the reinvestment of the proceeds of
crime, back into the enterprise, it has become far more important
for law enforcement agencies to address the profitability of criminal
activity. By interrupting the flow of funds back into the continuing
criminal enterprise the criminal activity in question may be
destabilised or even in some cases undermined. Consequently,
today one of the most significant strategies in fighting profitable
crime is confiscating property which can be taken to be the
proceeds of crime. The more efficient such procedures are the
greater incentive there is for criminal organisations to try and place
their ill-gotten gains beyond the reach of the law, or at least make it
more difficult for those seeking to trace it to prove to the
satisfaction of a court that the wealth in question represents the
proceeds of a specific crime. Hence the need to launder the
proceeds of crime. Most countries and international organisations
have enthusiastically espoused this strategy and laws providing for
the confiscature of the proceeds of crime are commonplace. 8 Most
countries have such laws in relation to drug related crimes and an
increasing number apply the same approach to all serious crime.
These laws are reinforced by others, which render the handling and
laundering of such wealth a specific criminal offence. The breadth
and scope of such provisions are impressive. For example, if a man
took profits that he made through insider dealing on the New York
Stock Exchange and then bought a house in London in which his
58. For the substantive law of most jurisdictions, see BARRY RIDER & T.M.
ASHE (eds.) INTERNATIONAL TRACING OF ASSETS (Sweet and Maxwell 1997);
BARRY RIDER AND C. NAKAJIMA, MONEY LAUNDERING SERVICE (C.C.H. 1999).
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girl friend lived, provided she knew of the circumstances, she would
under English law be susceptible to a charge under the anti-money
laundering laws. 9 It is, therefore, perhaps hardly surprising that in
the USA prosecutors are increasingly prepared to add or even
concentrate their efforts, on a charge of illicit money laundering in
cases of insider abuse or financial fraud. Often they will also seek
to invoke the evidential and procedural advantages of legislation
designed to deal with a pattern of criminal activity by organised
crime.' Although the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organisation statute (RICO)61 was designed to deal with the
activities of traditional organised crime, such as la cosa nostra, it
has proved particularly useful in dealing with economic crime
perpetrated by those who would not normally be thought of as
members of organised crime groups."
These new laws and the regulatory and compliance obligations
that they ordain, have imposed a very considerable burden on all
those who mind other peoples' money and in particular upon the
financial services industry.63 Indeed, it is arguable that they have
had as much impact on the way in which business is actually
conducted in the financial sector than those laws which were
enacted specifically for the markets and industry. For example, the
obligations to know your customer and to varying degrees vouch
for the integrity of his transactions, have had a profound impact
upon the way business is done. Often little or no thought has been
given to the inter-play between these new laws and existing
obligations in the civil law." Would the obligation to know about a
client's circumstances and transactions impact on the suitability
doctrine. Ironically, it was in the USA that the Stock Exchange
rules, designed to ensure that investment advice is suitable to the
circumstances of a client,65 were employed by the regulators to
59. See generally R. BOSWORTH-DAVIES AND G. SALTMARSH, MONEY
LAUNDERING Ch. 5 (Chapman & Hall 1994).
60. See J. H. ISRAEL, E. S. PODGOR & P. BORDMAN, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
Ch. 6 (West Publishing 1996).
61. Organised Crime Contract Act, Title IX (1970).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1983); Mark
Thatcher Faces $3 million Racketeering Lawsuit in Texas, THE OBSERVER, Oct. 2,
1994.
63. See generally Barry Rider, The Limits of the Law: An Analysis of the
Interrelationship of the Criminal and Civil Law in the Control of Money
Laundering, 2 J. of Money Laundering Control 209 (1999). See C. Nakajima,
Money Laundering and Constructive Liability, THE CORPORATE DIMENSION
(Jordans 1998).
64. See Barry Rider, supra note 63.
65. See N.Y.S.A. Rules and Regulations 405, and BARRY RIDER & H.L.
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develop the obligation on intermediaries to know their clients.
They could not demonstrate that they had taken steps to ensure
that their advice or management was suitable if they had not taken
steps to ascertain their clients' circumstances and needs.66 In
Britain the relationship of the so called "know your client" rule to a
fast developing area of the law which imposes liability on those who
receive property in breach of trust or who give dishonest assistance
in the laundering of such property is far from clear.67 Indeed, it may
well be the case that the obligation to seek out those who have a
claim against such property, conflicts with the obligation imposed
by the criminal law not to disclose to the authorities, a suspicion
that a crime has been committed.' Given the intrusion of the
criminal law into the financial and commercial world and the
relative ignorance of public lawyers of this area of activity, and for
that matter of commercial lawyers of the responsibilities of the
criminal justice system, it is perhaps not surprising that there is so
much potential for conflict. Of course, in an area of activity that is
so international in its operations, the potential for conflict not only
between domestic laws, but with the requirements of other
jurisdictions is so much greater.
The pursuit of insiders suspected of abusing inside information,
particular by the US authorities, has highlighted a number of
deficiencies in the then arrangements for international mutual legal
assistance. 69 In Britain, as has already been mentioned the self-
regulatory authorities protested that it was because of the lack of
cooperation of the then Swiss authorities and thus, their inability to
seek information from Swiss banks, that frustrated their ability to
satisfactorily investigate cases of suspected insider dealing. It was
FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING Ch. 16 (Macmillan 1979).
66. Under section 178 of the Financial Services Act 1986, an inspector
appointed to inquire into a suspected case of insider dealing is entitled to demand
from an agent or nominee the details of his principal and it is expressly provided
that it is not an excuse for that person to contend that he does not know or, for
that matter, the laws of another jurisdiction would impose liability upon him for an
unauthorised disclosure, provided those laws would permit disclosure had
permission been obtained at the start of the relevant relationship. See generally,
BARRY RIDER, C. ABRAMS & T.M. ASHE, C.C.H. GUIDE TO FINANCIAL
REGULATION 238 (3rd Ed. C.C.H. 1998).
67. See Barry Rider, Liability for Conflicts of Interest-An English Problem, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (Kluwer 1996).
68. See C. NAKAJIMA, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND DUTY (Kluwer 1999).
69. See generally D. Chaikin, Fraud, Securities Laws and Extraterritoriality, in
THE REGULATION OF THE BRITISH SECURITIES INDUSTRY (Oyez 1979); Barry
Rider, Policing the International Financial Markets, XVI BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179
(1990).
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this factor which persuaded many in the City of London to call for
the intervention of law, reinforced by powers of investigation which
were legally sanctioned. Of course, the mere conversion of
investigatory powers from the realm of contract law into that of
public law, is not always helpful when the information or evidence
is out of jurisdiction. Indeed, it may well be better in such cases to
rely upon informal and therefore almost "unaccountable"
procedures. When legal and coercive powers are used, then it is
entirely appropriate that those utilising them are subject to scrutiny
and control by the legal system. Where, however, the inquiry is
conducted without the benefit of legal sanction, on an informal
basis, then it may be argued there is less justification for such
control and in any case the process is far less visible.7" In fact,
obtaining information from banks and other intermediaries is not in
the main a problem. It is always possible to find a weak link or
someone who is prepared, for a price to be indiscreet. The
difficulty, for those charged with the enforcement of the law, is
rendering such information admissible and useable in their own
domestic legal system.
Certainly, one of the main stumbling blocks to the effective
investigation and then prosecution of economic crime has been the
impenetrability of bank secrecy and confidentiality laws in
countries which have made it their business to hide the details of
shady and illicit transactions.' Therefore many of the initiatives
that have taken place at both bilateral and multilateral levels to
promote meaningful mutual assistance, have focussed on the crimes
of insider dealing and money laundering.72  The institutional
imperatives behind such initiatives are not without interest. In the
70. This author is not necessarily commending such an approach. Indeed,
there are profound issues, not least of human rights, when those not subjected to
the discipline and scrutiny of the law are permitted to engage in enforcement
related activity. In fact, he has criticised on a number of occasions the practise that
the Securities and Investments Board (the predecessor of the Financial Services
Authority in the UK) adopted of instructing private investigators and then on
occasion arming them with the SIB's own legal investigatory powers. See Barry
Rider, Policing the City-Combating Fraud and Other Abuses in the Corporate
Securities Industry, 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 47 (1988).
71. See generally M. Kenney, The Penetration of Asset Protection Trusts, 6
J.F.C. 111 (1998), and Barry Rider, Taking Money Launderers to the Cleaners,
PRIVATE CLIENT BUSINESS 134, 201, 307 (1996). See also G. Moscarino and M.
Shumaker, Beating the Shell Game; Bank Secrecy, Laws and their Impact on Civil
Recovery in International Fraud Actions, 18 Co. LAW 177 (1998), and A.
EDWARDS, REVISION OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE CROWN DEPENDENCIES
Part 1 (1998).
72. See generally, T. Newkirk, The SEC's International Enforcement
Programme: Gathering Evidence outside the USA, 6 J.F.C. 234 (1999).
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USA the Securities and Exchange Commission did go through a
period during which certain of its officials elevated the fight against
insider abuse to the level of a crusade. Whether this was due to a
real concern to present the good face of capitalism, or perhaps
more cynically to carve out an international enforcement role, with
all the kudos that this involves, is a matter for history. In fact, it
was the extraordinary efforts that were made by the Americans to
police their anti-insider dealing law, which pioneered the
development of mutual assistance through memoranda of
understanding and in particular in regard to inter-agency
cooperation and exchange of intelligence. This is even more
impressive, when it is remembered that so few cases of insider
abuse in the USA were or, for that matter, are pursued as criminal
prosecutions.
Why agencies, such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission placed so much importance on outlawing and pursuing
insider dealing at an international level is a matter for debate.73
There can be little doubt that in part, the initiative was political,
motivated and justified by institutional and even the personal and
career aspirations of ambitious individuals. There are those,
however, who have discerned a rather deeper significance. There
can be little doubt that over the last two decades a number of
agencies charged not only with protecting the national interest in
matters of defence and security, but also traditional law
enforcement, have increasingly recognised the importance of
information pertaining to financial transactions. This has proved to
be particularly useful in developing intelligence on the structure
and operations of organised crime and for that matter terrorism. In
some respects it has proved easier and probably more acceptable
for enforcement agencies to pressurise foreign banks and
institutions, often through the use of civil enforcement powers, to
cooperate in providing relevant information in the context of
inquiries into suspected financial misconduct, such as insider
dealing, than in regard to certain other areas of concern. Although
it is probably unjustified to contend that insider dealing cases have
been utilised as convenient Trojan horses to open up foreign
regulatory and financial systems, it would be equally misconceived
to try explain the extraordinary efforts that US agencies have gone
to, simply on the basis of their desire to pursue those who abuse
73. See Barry Rider, Global Regulatory Trends- The Changing Legal Climate,
MONEY LAUNDERING, ASSET FORFEITURE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
CRIMES (Oceana 1994).
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inside information. In the case of Switzerland, despite an existing
mutual assistance treaty, the USA forced the Swiss authorities to
broaden the scope of cooperation to include matters, which at the
time the Swiss did not consider to be a criminal, by pushing several
major insider dealing cases to the point of diplomatic
embarrassment.74 Pressure was also placed on a number of other
European countries as well as Japan. In all cases, the USA's
concern to facilitate the fight against insider dealing grew into a
broader initiative against the proceeds of crime and in particular
drug related crime.7" Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that
in the minds of legislators, control of insider abuse becomes linked
to the fight against organised crime, by depriving criminals of their
illicit profits. In Britain this is not simply a matter of both issues
being addressed in the same piece of legislation; The Criminal
Justice Act 1993. The Draft Financial Services and Markets Bill
1998 provides a specific mandate for the Financial Services
Authority to concern itself, as one of its statutory objects, with the
reduction of financial crime. Clause 6 of the Draft Bill defines
financial crime to include, inter alia, "misconduct in, or misuse of
information relating to, a financial market; or handling the
proceeds of crime."
The experience of the UK and for that matter most other
countries, with the notable exception of the USA, in policing anti-
money laundering law has not been markedly different to that
pertaining to insider dealing. The same is also true in regard to
confiscature of the proceeds of crime. Despite the fact that in
Britain there have been laws providing for the confiscature of the
proceeds of drug related crime since 1986 and all profitable crimes
since 1988, the amount of money and value of property actually
confiscated is derisory. Under this legislation,76 since the relevant
provisions came into force the British authorities have managed to
confiscate less that £42million of the proceeds of crime. Although
it is notoriously difficult to even guestimate the amount of wealth
passing through Britain that might represent the proceeds of crime,
it has been said by a former head of the Legal Directorate of the
74. See, e.g., SEC v. Banca Della Suizzera Italiana, 92 FRD 111 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
75. See generally J. Tigue, New Treaties Making Inroads into Foreign Bank
Secrecy, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 15, 1998.
76. See generally, A. MITCHELL, S. M. E. TAYLOR & K. V. TALBOT,
CONFISCATION AND THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME (Sweet & Maxwell 1997).
77. THIRD REPORT OF THE HOME OFFICE WORKING GROUP ON
CONFISCATION, CRIMINAL ASSETS 12-13 (1998).
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British intelligence and security services that the figure is in the
order of £200 billion a year. If this is anywhere near the truth, it
indicates that a strategy based on taking the profit out of crime,
through the ordinary criminal justice system, just does not work.79
It should also be remembered that the total cost to the financial and
banking community' of complying with the onerous anti-money
laundering laws has been put in the region of £300 million a year.
Of course, it would be wholly wrong to attempt to evaluate the
efficacy of the anti-money laundering regime solely on the basis of
how much money had been confiscated, as this involves a host of
different issues. On the other hand, the results do put yet another
question mark against the efficacy of the traditional criminal justice
system's ability or competence, to deal with misconduct in the
financial sector.
VII. Confidence-A Precious Commodity
Returning to the justification for regulating insider abuse in
Britain, by focussing on the time honoured responsibility of the
State to protect and nurture confidence in the integrity of the
markets, those who propounded the need for regulation excused
themselves from the need to seek out, let alone hearken to any
empirical, or for that matter, any data. If we accept that most
ordinary people consider taking advantage of inside information,
obtained by virtue of a privileged position, is unfair, then in the
world of practical politics, it does not really matter if the unfairness
cannot be rationalised in legal terms. Nor for that matter, whether
anyone is really hurt by the practice. It is enough to justify our
concern, that the media focus, as they inexorably do, on the
unfairness of insiders taking advantage of their position. This will
tend to underline the unfairness to others in the market and
alienate investors. It follows, that the State as guardian of the
public good, has the right if not the obligation to intervene and take
action to curb insider abuse. We are in the realm of sophistry and
cosmetic surgery. Even if, in purely pragmatic terms, we consider
the perception insider dealing occurs and is regarded as a matter of
popular sentiment, as unfair, it does not necessarily follow that the
State needs to intervene through the criminal law, or for that matter
7& See J. Adams, £200bn in Drugs Cash Heads for London Markets, SUNDAY
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995.
79. See Barry Rider, Taking the Gloves Off, 2 J. MONEY LAUNDERING
CONTROL 196 (1999).
80. See generally N. Clark, The Impact of Recent Money Laundering
Legislation on Financial Intermediaries, 3 J.F.C. 131 (1995).
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the legal system. The problem is, that if the State does seek to
utilise the law to vindicate and protect confidence in the integrity of
the market, and then the law is clearly unable to produce tangible
results, we are exposed to the danger of transferring the risk of loss
of public esteem from the markets to the legal system. Cosmetics
can be expensive, and at best merely put off the day of reckoning.
In Britain as the primary method for controlling the abuse of inside
information is the criminal law, it is not surprising that the media
and politicians tend to judge its efficacy in terms of the number of
convictions that are secured. Of course, this takes little account of
the normative and educative effect of the law.8' Furthermore, it is
at least arguable, although in the present context hardly convincing,
that insofar as a proven case of insider abuse indicates a break
down in the compliance procedures designed to discourage such
abuse, relatively few convictions may indicate effective prevention.
The problem with such a positive view of the statistics, is that The
Stock Exchange alone identifies nearly three hundred suspicious
cases a year. Since 1980, when insider dealing was first constituted
a specific criminal offence in Britain, there have been forty six
prosecutions. In thirty of these convictions have been recorded.
While this is not a bad conviction rate, the majority of those
convicted pleaded guilty. In the vast majority of cases no attempt
was made to quantify, let alone confiscate the insider's profit and it
has been said that in only two cases was the fine greater than the
amount by which the insider profited. The considerable costs
involved in pursuing a case of insider dealing must also be borne in
mind. Where inspectors are appointed under section 177 of the
Financial Services Act 1986, the statutory investigation may well
cost in excess of £150,000. Furthermore, criticism has also been
voiced as to the time that such investigations can take. It would be
relatively easy to present these facts in such a way as to place a
significant question mark against the efficacy and role of the
criminal justice system in this area of the law.
Little if no discussion has taken place, as to why the public or
81. See, e.g., Barry Rider, Insider Trading: An English Comment in New
Zealand, in ESSAYS ON INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES REGULATION (Brooker
1997); Barry Rider, Insider Trading, Professional Responsibility, in LEGAL
RESEARCH FOUNDATION INC, (1987); and Barry Rider & C. Nakajima, A
Comparative Analysis of Anti-Insider Dealing Legislation, in COMMERCIAL LAW IN
A GLOBAL CONTEXT (Kluwer 1998).
82. See generally, Memoranda Submitted to the House of Commons Select
Committee on Trade and Industry, in COMPANY INVESTIGATIONS, THE THIRD
REPORT OF THE TRADE AND INDUSTRY SELECT COMMrmrEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS
(H.M.S.O. 1990).
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that part of the public which may be considered to be leaders of
public opinion, consider insider dealing bad or unfair. It is possible
to invoke notions of unjust enrichment and the like, but it is rather
more likely that the predominant emotion at play here is just "old
fashioned" jealousy. We resent and object to insider trading
because the majority of us are not insiders. As we have already
pointed out, it is rather reminiscent of the debate on executive
privileges, remuneration and perks. While this view may be
thought cynical and simplistic there is a certain amount of
circumstantial evidence supporting it. A surprisingly high
proportion of the cases that are brought to court by the authorities
in the USA are first identified, not by sophisticated stock watch
programmes, but by whistle blowers. A good many of these
"publicly spirited" informants turn out to be individuals who have a
grudge against the person concerned or who are likely to be jealous
of his or her success. In fact, it remains to be seen whether the
enforcement results obtained in the USA would be sustainable
without such informants. The US Congress recognising this, passed
legislation in 1988 authorising the Securities and Exchange
Commission to reward informants out of the sums recovered by
enforcement action against insiders. A similar suggestion to pay
bounties to informers in Britain, was thought in 1990 by the House
of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry to be too
avant-garde. It has been said, that a law which depends so much on
such base emotions for its effective enforcement, is a law that is not
worth having.
VIII. Europe's Contribution
The Council of Europe's Insider Dealing Directive83 which was
adopted in 1989 represents a process which can be traced back to a
report of a committee of experts appointed by the European
Commission in 1966.' During the protracted discussions that took
place over the years within the Commission and its innumerable
expert working groups, relatively little consideration was given to
the theoretical justifications for regulating insider abuse or what
devices might prove to be efficacious in controlling it. Of course,
there was a considerable divergence of experience within the
83. 89/592 EEC. See J. Dine, European Foundation, in THE FIDUCIARY, THE
INSIDER AND THE CONFLICT (Brehon, Sweet & Maxwell 1995).
84. See generally BARRY RIDER & H. L. FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF
INSIDER TRADING 263 (Macmillan 1979); Barry Rider & T. M. Ashe, The Insider
Dealing Directive, in THE FIDUCIARY, THE INSIDER AND THE CONFLICT (Brehon,
Sweet & Maxwell 1995).
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Community and 'vastly different standards in and expectations of
enforcement." The Directive in its Preamble, harks back to the
now somewhat discredited approach of market egalitarianism
encountered in the earlier stages of the development of US
jurisprudence.' Equality is no doubt a well appreciated concept,
but whether it has a meaningful role to play in the modern markets
remains to be seen. While equality of opportunity, may be a goal
worthy of attainment, to espouse equality of information as a
regulatory concept is too idealistic. As the US Supreme Court
recognised nearly twenty years ago, 7 when it doubted the simplicity
of the abstain or disclose rule, the markets have moved on and
today they are serviced by an industry if not profession of
information gathers, sifters and assessors. An efficient and
efficacious disclosure system has to take account of this. The
European Directive is equally naive in espousing as a regulatory
goal the somewhat continental notion of "smooth markets."
Paradoxically, it was Professor Henry Manne who argued, more
than most, that insider dealing smoothed-out, what would otherwise
be disruptive market adjustments, by bring the price up or down to
the level justified by the relevant information.' It has generally
been assumed that even if insiders are capable of achieving such
effects in the market, which is highly debatable, it is unclear why
they should be allowed to derive a personal benefit. Of course, it
might be said in reply that there is equally no reason why they
should not expect remuneration for their "public" service, perhaps
an argument not too distant from Manne's in regard to
entrepreneurs. Although to some degree the Directive takes a
rather different stance, to the way in which we have justified anti-
insider dealing regulation in Britain and its implementation did
result in significant changes in the British law, it is still perfectly
possible to describe the UK law as reflecting its traditional concern
to maintain public confidence in the markets.
The European Directive does underline the importance of
timely disclosure of material information. While it has long been
appreciated in the financial markets, that investors have a
legitimate expectation of prompt disclosure of information that
would effect their decisions, unless such would harm the legitimate
interests of the issuer and market, the law has remained largely
85. See generally E. GILLARD (ed.), INSIDER TRADING (Kluwer 1992); C.
RABI'rri, L'INSIDER TRADING (Giuffre Editore 1992).
86. See BARRY RIDER & T. M. ASHE, INSIDER CRIME (Jordans 1993).
87. See Dirks v. SEC 463 U.S. 464; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222.
88. See INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (The Free Press 1966).
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uninterested. The obligation to make timely disclosure was left to
The Stock Exchange and in the case of take-overs and mergers to
the City Panel on Take-overs.89 Unless disclosure would be
necessary to correct an earlier representation, then there was at law
no general duty on an issuer to make timely disclosure. The notion
that the more such information was brought into the market, the
less scope there was for insiders to take advantage of it or engage in
manipulative practices, received little attention. The Stock
Exchange has long placed an obligation, by virtue of the Listing
Agreement, on quoted issuers to report material changes as and
when they occur, in addition to the ordinary periodic disclosure of
relevant information. This duty to make timely disclosure was,
however, predicated on the correction or avoidance of a false
market. Somewhat surprisingly, until relatively recently there was a
widespread view that an ill-informed market was not a false market.
The mere fact that material information was in existence, did not
necessarily oblige an issuer to disclose it. If there was no evidence
that it had leaked, then provided the issuer had a legitimate interest
in withholding it, the information in question could be kept
confidential. The combined effect of the Directive on the
Coordination of Conditions for the Admission of Securities to
Official Stock Exchange Listing ° and the Insider Dealing Directive,
is to impose on issuers who are listed, or have their securities traded
on a recognised market an obligation to make timely disclosure.
The obligation, is, however, imposed in a rather round about
manner, and for listed companies remains only contractual.91 It has
been argued that as in certain other jurisdictions, such as Canada,
2
it would be sensible to impose a statutory obligation on companies
to disclose price sensitive information, subject to certain caveats
and protections, as and when it becomes sufficiently certain so as
not to risk being misleading.9
IX. Misappropriating Ideas?
It is also perhaps surprising that there has been no real
89. See generally Barry Rider, INSIDER TRADING 155 and Ch. 4 (Jordans 1983);
Barry Rider and E. J. Hew, The Role of the City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers
in the Regulation of Insider Trading in Britain, 20 MAL. L.R. 315 (1978); Barry
Rider (ed.) BRITISH FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION SERVICE (C.C.H.).
90. 79/279 E.E.C.
91. See BARRY RIDER & T. M. ASHE, INSIDER CRIME 10 (Jordans 1993).
92. See, e.g., Ontario Security Act § 74.
93. See, e.g., J. Spander QC, REPORT INTO THE AFFAIRS OF COLLINS
HOLDINGS LTD, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES (1978).
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discussion in Britain, or for that matter elsewhere in Europe, about
condemning the unauthorised use of price sensitive information on
the basis that it belongs to someone else.94 In the USA, the idea
that the personal use or unauthorised disclosure of information
obtained in a privileged position, is objectionable in itself, has long
been relevant in fashioning the law's approach to insider dealing.
In more recent times the wrong involved in misappropriating
another's information and then using it for personal profit, has
become the primary justification for the law's intervention.9 This is
not the place to enter upon a discussion of the so called
misappropriation theory, but it is interesting, given the English
law's interest in recognising and protecting confidential
relationships, that such an approach has not found supporters in
Britain. This may be explained by the more restrictive attitude, in
Britain to what is and what is not information capable of protection
through an action for breach of confidence and until very recently
the English law's reluctance to contemplate a viable law of
restitution. As has already been pointed out, it is conceivable that a
person in a fiduciary position who misused, by use or disclosure,
information that came to him by virtue of his relationship, could be
held accountable. 96 The obligation, however, is owed to the person
with whom he is in that confidential relationship. Consequently,
such remedy as may be available, will be compensatory or possibly
restitutory. At this point in time, it is hardly conceivable that the
quantum jump long taken by the US courts, on the back of Rule
10B5, would be feasible for an English judge. To contend that
there is a misrepresentation to the market, arising by virtue of the
obligation not to abuse a private confidential relationship with
someone else, would in English law be untenable.' It is, with
respect, the intervention of Rule 10B5 with its attendant
jurisprudence, which enables the US courts to convert what is at
most a breach of confidence into a fraud on the market, justifying
remedies and sanctions far more reminiscent of penal sanctions,
94. See Barry Rider, Abuse of Inside Information, 127 N.L.J. 830 (1977).
95. See supra note 42; United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1981);
SEC v. Materia 745 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1984); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551 (2nd Cir. 1991); SEC v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2nd Cir. 1993).
96. See supra note 13.
97. But see the author's argument in regard to the former Section 13 of the
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, available in Barry Rider, The Crime
of Insider Trading, 19 J.B.L. (1978); see in regard to a similar argument under
Israeli law, A. YORAN, INSIDER TRADING IN ISRAEL AND ENGLAND 59 (The
Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law of the Hebrew University
1972).
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than the usual devices of the civil law. Although the present author
has in the past argued that the British equivalent to Rule 10B5,
could be stretched to cases of insider abuse, and recent legislative
proposals would more or less accomplish this, the vitality of the
English law in this regard is but a sallow reflection of its American
cousin. Before leaving the misappropriation theory, however, it
should be noted that the British law in its statutory offences, insofar
as insider status and inside information are tied to relationships
which may be expected to afford privileged access to inside
information, inevitably recognises, albeit in a very attenuated and
often weak form, a notion of confidentiality. This was more explicit
in the pre-1993 law, but is still discernible even in the far more open
textured provisions imported from the Directive.
X. Scandals-the Engine of Reform
The history of financial services regulation in Britain records
that, in the main, reform is scandal driven.98 This is also the case in
many other jurisdictions. Almost every significant reform of the
law or its administration in Britain has occurred as a direct result of
the concern felt after a major scandal which has either dramatically
illustrated the incompetence of the existing law or a significant
lacuna in regulation.9 Sadly this has meant that experimentation
and refinement of the law and regulatory devices has been
pragmatic and has generally only been viable when it can be
conveniently attached to the coat tails of some measure that is
justified by public outrage. Perhaps one of the best, and yet saddest
examples of this, albeit taken from the USA, is the American Law
Institute's Draft Federal Securities Code. Despite years of work by
some of the most eminent securities lawyers in the world, led by
Professor Louis Loss, the Code has had surprising little effect in the
USA."° One of the few countries where it has been taken seriously
and enacted in part is Pakistan, 1°1 a country that hardly has a
98. See generally G. Gilligan, The Origins of UK Financial Services Regulation,
18 Co. LAW 167 (1997); G. Gilligan, The Michael Lawrence Sacking-A
Confirmation of the Regulatory Traditions of the Stock Exchange and City of
London, 4 J.F.C. 207 (1997); Barry Rider (ed.) BRITISH FINANCIAL REGULATION
SERVICE (C.C.H.)
99. A very significant exception to this is the present major programme for
company law reform in Britain initiated by the Department of Trade and Industry.
See MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY, THE STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK (D.T.I. 1999).
100. See generally L. Loss, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
(Little Brown 1996).
101. See generally Barry Rider, Blindman's Bluff-A Model for Securities
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financial services industry. On the other hand, there are those who
point out that financial services regulation is not an end in itself. It
is there to facilitate the efficient, orderly and perhaps even fair
operation of the markets as allocators of scarce resources. True, it
is also there to reflect and where necessary protect other public
interests, such as the maintenance and advancement of probity,
competence and where appropriate stewardship. Consequently,
given its finite role, it is only necessary and perhaps even desirable
that legislators and regulators do only find the time to intervene
once a significant deficiency has been clearly identified. If
something is not broke why mend it? This somewhat minimalist
approach, while no doubt reflecting a certain amount of reality,
does not take account of changing attitudes and the development
and refinement of standards in the market and industry. It is no
doubt the case that the trend to focus more on requiring those who
manage other peoples' money to conform to certain objective
criteria of competence and financial soundness may in large
measure be a response to the inability of the criminal law to deal
with blatant fraud and abuse, with the consequence that we have
effectively lowered the threshold of liability or at least activated
prudential surveillance at a lower level than sin, but there is also a
real change in attitude. It is now no longer appropriate for
regulators, or even governments, to confine their activities to the
prevention and control of fraud. It is in everyone's interest that
investment decisions are taken sensibly, with the support of
competent and well informed professional advice. The knee-jerk
approach to legislation also does not address the need for
regulatory systems to take account of fundamental developments in
the markets or the development of external, but intrusive
standards. For example, in Britain the law is subject not only to
influence from Brussels, but also must take account of the global
market.
It is perhaps surprising that the perceived ability of a
regulatory system to deal with insider abuse has played such a
significant role in assessing the general efficiency and efficacy of the
system as a whole. We have already seen the way in which the
debate on insider dealing coloured and, indeed, drove discussion as
to the shape and content of securities regulation in Britain. But this
is equally the case in many other jurisdictions, ranging from
Australia to the Netherlands. While this may be allowing the "tail
Regulation?, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANISATION (Kluwer 1996).
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to wag the dog." it is perhaps understandable in political terms.
Insider abuse is in its most simplistic form well understood by the
media and public. It is depreciated because it illustrates all the
wrongs of privilege and elitism and can therefore be easily isolated
and sensationalised. Whether the ability of a regulatory system to
address, other than in purely cosmetic or public relations terms, this
problem, matters a great deal to the market, remains, in the view of
the present author, a matter for debate. Indeed, it was not that long
ago that at a meeting of representatives of senior regulators from
around the world, one very senior representative of an important
securities exchange, stated that if we accept that drawing attention
to insider abuse adversely effected confidence in the market, or at
least unnerved politicians, then perhaps the best solution was not to
bother looking for it. He added that in his experience, there were
few instances, anywhere in the world, where after insider abuse had
been identified and brought to the public's attention, the public
were suitably impressed by the results of regulatory or legal action.
Indeed, in his view it was sensible, as his market operated in a
jurisdiction where insider abuse was taken "seriously," to slow
down and even delay the proceedings so that by the time a sanction
or punishment was imposed, or in the case of his jurisdiction
"agreed" the press and public would have lost interest in the
specific case. Consequently, it was the most dedicated and efficient
regulators who really got their hands burnt by insider dealing. The
motto of all good market regulators, in his view, should be that of
the proverbial three wise monkeys, "see no evil, hear no evil, speak
no evil." Although this gentleman did not receive a standing
ovation, there was widespread agreement, and in time he went on
to join in a very senior position his own country's statutory
regulatory authority!
It cannot therefore be assumed that even within the agencies
and organisations charged with policing insider abuse, or at least
identifying it, that there is always great dedication and
determination to take action and be exposed. Little work has
hitherto taken place by criminologists or other social scientists on
the enforcement culture within non-police agencies such as
regulatory commissions and self-regulatory bodies. We are told,
that in the case of police agencies, officers do not like being
assigned the investigation of fraud and economic crime cases
because they are not sufficiently macho. The investigatory process
is time consuming, complex, boring and rarely leads to any drama.
Arrests are few and convictions even fewer. In other words, this
type of police work is not for those who are ambitious or who like
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excitement. Of course, things have changed a little with the
recognition of the importance of financial based intelligence and
the realisation that organised crime is really nothing more, in many
cases, than a business. In the result, ambitious policemen will be
prepared to "put their time in" to fraud work, but only as a means
to an end. Indeed, because of the inability of conventional police
agencies to get satisfactory results in cases of economic crime, in
many countries responsibility for the investigation of specific areas
of abuse, such as that involving the financial markets, has been
taken out of traditional law enforcement and entrusted to either
special agencies or effectively franchised to private, in some cases
commercial, bodies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to raise, let
alone discuss, all the issues of accountability, human rights and
competence-legal and otherwise, that arise in such circumstances.
Nor is it feasible to address the myriad of problems, that can and do
arise in parallel proceedings. That is to say where proceedings are
initiated at different levels within the legal system on the same
evidence and involving the same parties. In such cases there are
profound issues as to evidence, the standard of proof and the
compatibility and management of proceedings. Obviously, the
proliferation of authorities charged with different responsibilities
increases the risk of multiple proceedings. In cases of insider
dealing it is conceivable that there might be concurrently a criminal
prosecution, civil enforcement proceedings, civil litigation for
compensation or restitution, disciplinary proceedings, collateral
actions against those involved as secondary offenders or as
professional facilitators, as well as the real possibility of
proceedings overseas."
Many of those who work in regulatory authorities, with special
responsibility for the investigation, and even in some countries the
prosecution, of abuse in a particular environment, may well be at
variance with the attitude and culture encountered in ordinary
police agencies. They will often be disassociated from conventional
law enforcement, but will wish to be identified with and will
invariably be drawn into what they perceive to be a pseudo-police
culture. The problem is that their authority is limited, indeed, it
may even be questioned, if not resented by police and other law
enforcement agencies. They will not, unless they are retired police
officers, have personal or professional credibility with other law
enforcement agents and they will not have the moral and political
102- See M. Andenas, Enforcement of Financial Market Regulation-Problems
of Parallel Proceedings, C.E.L. KING'S COLLEGE, Working Paper 1/95 (1995).
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authority of being a member of a large, highly visible and structured
agency. This will inevitably impact on their own self-confidence
and attitudes to other agencies. There will be no real career path
and little opportunity for diversification. Lawyers and accountants
who are recruited for such posts, without the benefit of relevant
training, may well be tempted to assume the guise of inquisitors
rather than investigators, and attempt to make up for in image what
they lack in experience. Recent history has shown, that in these
agencies, those charged with the enforcement function often have
inadequate knowledge in regard to the taking, maintenance and
presentation of evidence and very little regard for the rights of
suspects. It would be unfair and unjustified to suggest that all such
regulatory authorities have been unable to address these problems.
There are many agencies, particularly in North America, where the
competence and training of such officers is second to none.
However, it must be recognised that in any authority that has a
limited mandate the criteria for success or failure are rather more
focussed and therefore the implications, both institutionally and
personally, in pursuing matters which lead to disappointment or
embarrassment are so much greater.
It was partly as a result of the frustration felt by the highly
competent staff within the US Securities and Exchange
Commission, with the way in which District Attorneys in the Justice
Department were reviewing and proceeding with their cases, that
they developed a viable civil enforcement jurisdiction for the
Commission, over which they retained control. Given the
identification of individual members of staff with the special
enforcement mandate of the agency, where individual officers are
ambitious, there is a great danger for rules to be broken and for
abuse to ensue. It is not without interest that special investigatory
and prosecutorial agencies set up to spearhead enforcement in
areas such as financial and commercial crime, have themselves
experienced a disturbing high level of corruption. In looking at the
way in which the law is administered and applied in cases of insider
abuse, it is very dangerous to ignore the institutional imperatives
which operate within those organisations charged with policing the
law.
Those charged with policing the relevant law in Britain have
found insider dealing something of a "hot potato. ' 1°3 The
103. See Barry Rider, Policing Insider Dealing in Britain, in EUROPEAN INSIDER
DEALING, (Butterworths 1991); Barry Rider, Civilising the Law-the Use of Civil
Proceedings to Enforce Financial Services Law in the United Kingdom,
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Department of Trade and Industry has not distinguished itself over
the years as a particularly competent enforcer of either corporate
law or financial services law. While it was given powers to appoint
inspectors to conduct investigations into suspected cases of insider
dealing, by the Financial Services Act 1986, its role in policing
insider abuse has been diffident. The Serious Fraud Office
established in 1987 as a direct result of the Roskill Committee on
Fraud Trials has been reluctant to get involved in policing insider
dealing. Indeed, initially the view was taken that ordinary cases of
insider abuse would not come within its statutory mandate of
serious or complex fraud. Insider dealing was rather more a
technical or regulatory offence. This view has changed, but
nonetheless the SFO has not been eager to bring cases.
Consequently, the majority of prosecutions have been left in the
hands of the police, occasionally assisted by officials and inspectors
from the Department of Trade and Industry, with the prosecution
being brought by the Crown Prosecution Service. It is possible for
the Secretary of State for Trade or the Director of Public
Prosecutions to designate another authority to prosecute and on
one or two occasions The Stock Exchange has been authorised to
proceed. The Securities and Investments Board was not given
authority to prosecute cases of insider dealing, although it did enjoy
certain civil enforcement powers in regard to breaches of its own
rules. '°  The relevant rules address insider dealing by authorised
persons and their executing transactions for clients in circumstances
where they know or suspect that they might be in violation of the
statutory prohibitions on insider dealing. Although at least one
Chairman of SIB thought that its powers to enjoin violations of its
rules and seek restitution orders could therefore be used in cases of
insider abuse, the SIB never chanced its hand in such a case. By the
same token the various self-regulatory authorities whilst prepared
to contemplate disciplinary action on the back of a prosecution,
showed considerable reluctance to take the initiative.
XI. A New Beginning
The Labour Government, having expressed profound concern
as to the seeming inability of the regulatory system to adequately
discourage and then deal with abuses when they occurred,
announced in May 1998, with surprisingly little consultation, a
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Lloyds of London Press 1996).
104. See C. Currie, The Civil Law as a Means of Exploring Securities Law, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (Kluwer 1996).
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fundamental shake-up. The SIB was renamed the Financial
Services Authority and the Bank of England's role as supervisory
authority over banks and deposit-taking institutions was transferred
to it. The functions and responsibilities of the three remaining self-
regulatory organisations were merged into the Authority and its
remit extended to all financial products." The FSA as a super,
essentially onestop, financial regulator will be given over the course
of the next year or so authority to prosecute not only offences
under the Financial Services Act 1986, but also insider dealing and
certain offences under the Money Laundering Regulations, as we
have already seen. The new Draft Financial Services and Markets
Bill,'° when it becomes law, will not only furnish the FSA with the
requisite statutory authority, but also provide it with a new and
imaginative array of weapons. Apart from its disciplinary
jurisdiction, which will be statute based, rather than as hitherto
based on contract law, it will be armed with wide ranging civil
enforcement powers which go some way beyond those in sections 6
and 61 of the 1986 Act. It will be able to seek prohibitive and
remedial injunctions together with freezing orders from the Court.
It will also be able to seek, or order itself, restitution. Furthermore,
for breaches of its rules it will be able to impose fines itself. In
addition, to these powers the FSA will retain the investigatory
powers now contained in the 1986 Act, but amended so as to make
it clear that evidence obtained pursuant to their exercise can be
utilised in subsequent prosecutions. There can be no doubt that the
Government is able and willing to empower the FSA to assume the
primary enforcement role in regard to financial misconduct and
related activity. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the
institutional and other constraints, to which reference has already
been made will serve to undermine the enthusiasm that has so far
been evident within the newly constituted Authority. There is
widespread concern about the impact of the human rights
legislation on both the FSA's enforcement powers and in particular
its powers to sanction misconduct.
In the context of insider dealing, however, the most significant
proposal is the enactment of a new offence-that of market abuse.
105. See Barry Rider, C. Abrams & T. M. Ashe, GUIDE TO FINANCIAL
REGULATION Chs. 1 & 2 (3rd Ed. CCH 1998); R. Sarker, Reform of the Financial
Regulatory System, 11 Co. LAW 19 (1998). For background, see G. Gilligan, The
City of London, The Financial Centre of Europe-A Case Study in Regulation, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (Kluwer 1996).
106. July 1998, Treasury. See A. Alcock, The Draft Financial Services and
Markets Bill, 19 Co. LAW 258 (1998).
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The Government in the Consultation Document, 7 which
accompanies the Draft Bill, emphasises that market abuse can take
a number of forms including the misuse of inside information. It
makes it clear that the abuse of inside information is damaging not
only to the markets, but to the economy as a whole, increasing the
cost of raising capital. The Draft Bill, itself underlines the
importance of promoting and maintaining confidence in the
markets, by placing this at the top of the list, of statutory objectives
for the FSA. The new offence,"° which will need a considerable
amount of reshaping and drafting before enactment, provides that
market abuse is behaviour, which is defined as doing something or
not doing something, which occurs in relation to certain
investments traded on a market, which satisfies one or more of
three conditions. The first is that the behaviour is based on
information which is unavailable to informed participants in the
market who are unaware of the behaviour but which, if available to
such informed participants, would be likely to be regarded by them
as relevant in deciding whether or not to enter into transactions
involving investment of that kind. The other two conditions, are
rather more concerned with manipulative conduct and relate to
behaviour which creates a mistaken impression as to the state of the
market or circumstances of a particular investment, or is likely to
distort the market. Finally, for the offence to be committed the
behaviour in question must be likely, or if the circumstances were
publicly known or the behaviour became common place, or both,
would be likely, to damage confidence of such informed
participants that the market, so far as it relates to investments of
that kind, is a true and fair market. It should be noted that the
statutory wording does not require any intention on the part of
those engaged in the behaviour and most of the standards are
objective. The behaviour must occur in, or be in regard to an
investment, which is traded on a market in the UK.
Recognising the importance of secondary and derivative
trading, particularly in the context of insider abuse and market
manipulation, the Draft Bill provides that behaviour will be
considered to have occurred in regard to an investment, if it occurs
in relation to anything which is the subject matter of the relevant
investment, or if it occurs in relation to investments whose subject
matter is the relevant investment. It is also made clear that in the
107. FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS BILL: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
Part I Ch. 15 (Treasury July 1998).
108. Clause 56.
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case of market manipulation, it matters not whether the outcome
which is expressed as likely to occur, actually occurs or not.
The Draft Bill provides in clause 57, that the FSA must
prepare a code for the purpose of helping to determine whether or
not behaviour amounts to market abuse. The code should not only
be descriptive but also enumerate factors which, in the opinion of
the Authority, should be taken into account in determining whether
or not behaviour amounts to market abuse. Furthermore, perhaps
even more curiously worded, is a provision which states that the
Code may be relied upon so far as it tends to establish whether or
not the behaviour in question amounts to market abuse.
The FSA has published a consultative document"° and a draft
code in which it attempts to flesh out this rather strange provision.
In the code it is stated that information for the purposes of the code
and therefore, the offence, is information which persons using the
market would reasonably regard as significant in determining
whether to deal in an investment traded on that market. Thus,
relevant information may include information concerning the
business affairs or prospects of the issuer or a related company, or
the occurrence, or likely occurrence, of events which might affect
those affairs or prospects. The substantive provision in Clause
56(6) of the Bill also provides that information will not be
considered to be unavailable to informed participants in the market
if the information could be obtained by research or analysis on
behalf of such persons. The Code provides that disclosable
information is information which is required to be disseminated,
either immediately or in time, on or in relation to a market. This
would include information that is subject to timely or periodic
disclosure obligation whether imposed by law or presumably
contract. The law relating to insider dealing contained in the 1993
Act will remain in place untouched by the provisions of the Bill or
the Code. Although the provisions in the Code do not comport
entirely with the definitions found in the 1993 Act they in all
probability amount to much the same.
The Code, in describing behaviour which may amount to
market abuse, refers to the unfair use of relevant information. It
provides that a person who has privileged possession of relevant
information that is disclosable information should not deal in any
investment to which the information is relevant, if market users
would reasonably regard the information as significant in
109. MARKET ABUSE, CONSULTATION AND DRAFT CODE OF MARKET CONDUCT
(F.S.A. June 1998).
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determining whether to deal in that investment. Relevance of the
information is therefore tied to materiality. A person, according to
the Code will be in privileged possession of information for so long
as he knows or ought to know that other market users cannot
legitimately obtain that information. The Code adds that
commonly a person will have privileged possession because of a
special relationship the person has with the source, or because he
has obtained the information by reason of a disclosure that ought
not to have been made or was made mistakenly. It should be noted
that whether a person ought to know is to be judged against the
general knowledge, skill and experience expected of a person in his
office, employment or position. In other words, the test is
objective. Where a person has privileged possession of relevant
information that is also disclosable information, the Code makes it
clear that he should not do any act, nor engage in any course of
conduct, which might reasonably be considered as likely to
encourage or induce any other person to deal in investments to
which the information is relevant. Whether a person's actions
might reasonably be considered likely to encourage or induce
others to deal must be considered in the light of all the
circumstances, including accepted market practices and the
expertise of the persons concerned. The Code states that disclosing
the relevant information to another person will commonly
constitute encouragement. This is doubtful and goes considerably
further than the statutory provisions rendering encouragement of
another to deal on the basis of inside information an offence.
It is in the context of take-overs and mergers that it is thought,
at least in Britain, most insider dealing occurs. While there is
evidence that abuse of privileged information does occur in such
circumstances there is little convincing evidence that this is more
than in other situations. Nonetheless, insider dealing at the time of
take-overs and mergers has always attracted special attention. The
Code provides that where a person proposes to mount a take-over
bid in relation to a company the information about his proposals is
treated as relevant information and is disclosable information.
Consequently, any person in privileged possession of such
information may not use the information unless he is the offeror or
is acting for the offer. This does not add to the existing law, or for
that matter the provisions of the City Code on Take-overs and
Mergers. It is also provided, that an offer or person acting on
behalf of the offer may use the information only for the purposes of
pursuing the bid. The Code also encompasses the misuse of market
information, which it describes as "order-flow information."
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Information concerning a person's intention to deal in investments,
or information as to trades that have taken place may constitute
relevant information, depending upon its significance. This is in
line with the existing law.
Finally, the Code provides that a person may deal in
investments while in privileged possession of relevant information
that is disclosable information if he can demonstrate that the
information did not in any way influence him in determining
whether to deal. A very onerous obligation!
Perhaps the most significant aspect to the new offence of
market abuse, is that it will not attract criminal liability. It is a civil
offence, which gives rise to a civil fine. The Draft Bill will empower
the FSA to impose fines itself or apply to the court for the
imposition of a fine. Furthermore, the Authority will also be able
to seek injunctions and orders from the Court specifically in regard
to cases of market abuse and may seek, or itself impose an order for
restitution." ° While at this stage it is not entirely clear whether the
existing provisions enabling private investors to sue for a statutory
tort in the event of breaches of certain provisions and rules, will
extend to the market abuse offence, it is thought that provision will
be made for such suits. It is important to appreciate that this new
regime will operate along side the existing law relating to insider
dealing and, of course, the relevant provisions in the City Code on
Take-overs and Mergers and in the Listing Agreement.
XII. Chinese Walls and Other Puzzles
Another issue that has arisen and will be addressed by the new
legislation, either directly or through the FSA's rule making
powers, is the position of multiple function fiduciaries. It has long
been recognised that where a financial intermediary is engaged in,
for example, investment advisory and corporate finance work, or
acts for a number of clients-with possibly competing interests, a
strict application of the fiduciary law in regard to the avoidance and
control of conflicts of interest might cause serious difficulties for all
concerned and not least the intermediary. "' It is conceivable that
110. The author has long advocated this approach, see, e.g., Barry Rider, The
Day of the Civil Sanction?, 17 Co. LAW 257 (1996); Barry Rider, See No Evil, 18
Co. LAW (1997); Barry Rider, Getting Tough with the Market, 19 Co. LAW 289
(1998). Indeed, he expressed the view in July 1975 that the then proposals for
regulating insider abuse would not work without new and radical enforcement
procedures. See Barry Rider, One Aspect of the Unacceptable Face of Capitalism:
The Crime of Being Something Big in the City, 9 OITER 11 (1975).
111. See Barry Rider, The Fiduciary and the Frying Pan, THE CONVEYANCER
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an investment client might complain where information within the
intermediary, obtained by virtue of another relationship, has not
been utilised by the intermediary to maximise his profits or,
perhaps more seriously avoid a loss. Indeed, even if a claim based
on the fiduciary relationship was thought, for one reason or
another, to be untenable, then it may well be that there is a viable
claim in the tort of negligence, or even in a limited number of cases,
contract. There is also the problem of confidential information. To
what extent can one client protect information that is attributable
to the relationship that he has with the intermediary, from use by
the intermediary for the benefit of others with whom it is also in a
fiduciary relationship. If the information in question constituted
inside information, the intermediary might well find itself in
difficulty under the criminal law. It has been said, that the civil law
could not condemn an intermediary for failing to use information
which would amount to a criminal offence. Indeed, one minister
said it was nonsense to assert that a fiduciary could be impeached
for failing to rob a bank for his beneficiary. This rather misses the
point. The fact is that the criminal law is not wide enough to
encompass every situation in which there may be a real prospect of
civil liability. Furthermore, this does not address, for example the
problem of liability in negligence or the ability of a client to protect
the risk of misuse of information otherwise by trading in
investments. In Britain, as in most countries,"' the expedient of a
"Chinese Wall" has been employed to segregate both information
and functions within the intermediary which might be considered to
involve competing obligations. The problem with such a device is
that it might prevent the flow of information but it does not address
the fundamental conflict of interest and duty. The courts have been
reluctant to accept that the segregation, within a single entity, can
resolve the issue of conflict. Furthermore, in a recent decision by
the House of Lords,' it was held that such internal arrangements
can only serve as a defence to allegations of misuse of confidential
information, if they are built within the very institutional structure
of the business and remain intact. Indeed, in another recent
114 (1978); Barry Rider, Conflicts of Interest and Chinese Walls, THE REGULATION
OF THE BRITISH SECURITIES INDUSTRY (Oyez 1979).
112. See generally C. NAKAJIMA, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND DUTY (Kluwer
1999); H. MCVEA, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES AND THE CHINESE WALL
(Oxford University Press 1992). See also H. McVea, Regulatory Rules and the
Common Law: the Impact of the Chinese Wall on Liability for Deceit and in
Contract, 17 Co. LAW 290 (1996); G. McCormack, Conflicts of Interest and the
Investment Management Function, 2 Co. LAW 20 (1999).
113. Bolkiah v. KPMG, I All E.R. 517 (1999).
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decision, the House of Lords'14 emphasised that it must be
remembered that the adequacy of compliance arrangements only
went to the issue of mitigation. If what is forbidden has in fact
occurred then liability will follow as day follows night. The Law
Commission examined,"5 among other things, the viability of
Chinese Walls and while noting that the courts now accepted that
contractual delimitation of duties and expectations was possible,
and the otherwise strict responsibilities of a fiduciary might be
varied or mitigated through informed assent, there remained a real
problem. The Law Commission proposed specific legislation to
address the problem. The Government has indicated, in its
Consultative Document, that the Bill will ensure that compliance
with the FSA's rules relating to Chinese Walls which manage or
avoid conflicts of interest and help prevent insider dealing will
protect a firm not only against criminal liability for insider dealing,
but also against a civil action for breach of duty. This is welcome.
An area of the law that is not addressed, however, in any of the
Government's documents or those put out by the FSA is that of
attribution of knowledge. Obviously, although this is a particularly
important issue, not least in the context of insider dealing, it is
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it would be remiss not
to allude, at least en passant, to a line of recent cases in the English
courts which have altered the law of attribution and carried it to a
point that many might consider too far. The impact of these
developments on financial services law has received little attention
by the commentators, and yet the implications may be profound. In
Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No 2),116 the court was faced
with a situation, where to impose liability for breaching an order
outlawing a restrictive trade practice, it had to find that two
companies had entered into an arrangement, notwithstanding that
those who had been responsible for their company's operations had
been expressly instructed not to enter into any such arrangements
and had no semblance of authority to do so. In such circumstances,
the ordinary rules of attribution, let alone agency and vicarious
responsibility were useless. Lord Templeman stated that there
were areas of the law in which the public interest justified a robust
approach to such issues. He considered that "an employee who acts
114. Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No 2), I.A.C. 456 (1995).
115. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY RULES, CONSULTATION PAPER No
124 (H.M.S.O. 1992); FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY RULES, REPORT NO
236 (H.M.S.O. 1995).
116. See Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete, supra note 114; C. NAKAJIMA,
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND DUTY (Kluwer 1999).
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for the company within the scope of his employment is the
company." He added, "directors may give instructions, top
management may exhort, middle management may question and
workers may listen attentively.. ." but at the end of the day if what
is done is done by that employee within the scope of his
employment, he is the company. In such situations we are not
talking so much about attribution of knowledge or responsibility,
but merger of the individual with his organisation. This extreme
approach, no doubt justified on the facts, has been followed in
decisions pertaining to the reporting of aggregated interests in
shares and even fraud."7 The impact of this new doctrine on the
financial services industry may well be significant, and it is
unfortunate that it has not so far been addressed by the FSA.
XIII. A Pragmatic End!
In his paper the author has attempted, in a rather egocentric
and therefore rambling manner, to conduct the reader through the
issues, as he sees them relating to the effective control of insider
dealing, albeit in the main from the perspective of an English
lawyer. There are, of course, many other matters worthy of
discussion, but a line needs to be drawn somewhere. Consequently,
the author has not made any attempt to enter into a detailed
discussion of the framing or for that matter purport of the British
legislation. Such analysis is available elsewhere."' What he has
tried to bring out is, the pragmatic way in which the law has been
developed and administered in Britain and the institutional
considerations which effect enforcement. As the author indicated,
at the start of this paper, there was a time when he considered
insider abuse one of the most egregious crimes, but with the benefit
of mature reflection, and the cynicism that comes with having
himself served for nearly a decade as an investigator in an agency
concerned with serious economic crime, his views are today less
certain. Of course, matters that are of concern to society must be of
concern to those who govern society and are charged with
protecting the public interest. However, there is an issue of
balance, and there may be issues which require rather more
117. Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission,
2 A.C. 400 (1995). See also S. Robert-Tissot, A Fresh Insight into the Corporate
Criminal Mind, 17 Co. LAW 99 (1996).
118. See generally BARRY RIDER & T. M. ASHE, INSIDER CRIME (Jordans 1993);
T. M. ASHE & L. COUNSELL, INSIDER TRADING, (2nd Ed. Tolley 1993); B.
HANNIGAN, INSIDER DEALING (2nd Ed. Longman 1994); GORE BROWNE ON
COMPANIES (Jordans).
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attention than insider trading. Insider trading is not the most
heinous crime of the late twentieth century," although future
historians who look back at our newspapers might be forgiven for
thinking it was. We have accepted the expedient of criminal
legislation, without proper regard to the efficacy of such laws and
the impact that they might have on, for example, the civil and
commercial law. Insider dealing and financial misconduct does not
occur in a vacuum. We have paid perhaps too little attention to
ethical training and prevention. We have also tended to ignore the
institutional issues within enforcement. In this context we have not
even started to address the implications of electronic trading in a
global environment. What is certain is that concern about insider
abuse will not go away, it relates to something very fundamental-
human greed, and we can be morally certain that while we are still
on this planet we will always have insiders taking advantage, fairly
or otherwise, of the rest of us.
119. See BARRY RIDER (ed.) CORRUPTION: THE ENEMY WITHIN (Kluwer 1997);
Barry Rider, Insider Trading-a Crime of Our Times, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN BANKING AND FINANCE LAW, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS (Sweet & Maxwell
1989).
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